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Independent contract deployment verification
Verification completeMSC-BB-CVR-2026-001

BASEDBID Lock Contracts

Consolidated verification of published source metadata, constructor configuration, and deployed-runtime consistency for fourteen mainnet lock-contract deployments.

NetworksBNB · Robinhood · Base · EthereumIssued4 September 2026Version1.0
14Deployments
4Networks
4Contract families
1Documented variance
01

Executive conclusion

Deployment consistency established

All fourteen listed deployments were recorded and compared. Equivalent deployments were runtime-identical directly or after normalization of the documented immutable position-manager address, except for the localized BNB Smart Chain BasedV3UniswapLock variance described below.

Scope boundaryThis establishes deployment consistency under the stated methodology. It does not establish that the underlying source is secure, functionally correct, or suitable for every token, pool, hook, or user condition.

02

Verification controls

Work performed

Explorer verification

All fourteen listed deployments were recorded with published source-verification status.

Completed
Compiler configuration

Solidity 0.8.36, Prague EVM target, optimizer enabled with 200 runs.

Completed
Constructor configuration

Immutable position-manager addresses were decoded and recorded for every deployment.

Completed
Runtime comparison

Equivalent deployments were compared byte-for-byte, with immutable normalization used only where documented.

Completed
03

Deployment register

Fourteen mainnet contracts

NetworkContractAddressVerification result
BNB Smart ChainBasedV3UniswapLock0xb8f4eDA82c2c9D514FFF646e88e7297480C5dEaDExact match · localized variance documented
BNB Smart ChainBasedV3PCSLock0x82306A00f4Dd54482F708066142492f96DeBdEaDExact match · runtime identical to Base
BNB Smart ChainBasedV4Lock0xD77cBAcE1E6dEE8230Ac38294CEf13fA6871dEaDExact match · identical after immutable normalization
BNB Smart ChainBasedInfinityLock0xDdfa9b6EB5b6f5cFF64289c9391820889BabdEaDExact match · runtime identical to Base
Robinhood ChainBasedV3UniswapLock0x635f5b6A566573bef2E4E631DFf004baf3fEdEaDVerified · identical to Base after immutable normalization
Robinhood ChainBasedV3PCSLock0x82306A00f4Dd54482F708066142492f96DeBdEaDVerified · runtime identical to Base
Robinhood ChainBasedV4Lock0xF49Ddb31213C75C41776EdB41E06B821c4DadEaDVerified · identical to Base after immutable normalization
BaseBasedV3UniswapLock0xE91FC414B872859b4d3a37B3309EEdd44820dEaDExplorer exact match
BaseBasedV3PCSLock0x82306A00f4Dd54482F708066142492f96DeBdEaDExplorer exact match
BaseBasedV4Lock0xF537120Ec2fF398AD11F07DA7421C7B043A0dEaDExplorer exact match
BaseBasedInfinityLock0xDdfa9b6EB5b6f5cFF64289c9391820889BabdEaDExplorer exact match
EthereumBasedV3UniswapLock0x08740c80287603A8071287AD8d259e70e1C3dEaDExplorer exact match
EthereumBasedV3PCSLock0x82306A00f4Dd54482F708066142492f96DeBdEaDExplorer exact match
EthereumBasedV4Lock0x92746C1fc7eD907Cb678D09425d67062054BdEaDExplorer exact match
04

Documented variance

Localized BNB runtime difference

Recorded—not security-rated

After immutable normalization, the BNB Smart Chain BasedV3UniswapLock contains one localized three-byte sequence, 0x526024, in the ZeroAddress() revert-data construction. Removing that sequence produces an otherwise exact runtime match to Base.

The variance is documented without making a broader behavioral-equivalence or security conclusion.

05

Future review leads

Not security findings

These observations were noticed during the limited structural screen. They were not comprehensively validated and were not assigned security severities in this report.

BBL-01

Hook compatibility

V4 and Infinity positions whose hooks require nonempty decrease data may require deeper compatibility validation.

Deferred to separate deep review
BBL-02

Refund and balance assumptions

Whole-balance refund behavior and third-party position-manager accounting merit targeted testing.

Deferred to separate deep review
BBL-03

Fee-receiver handoff

The one-step receiver change has no acceptance step or administrator recovery path.

Deferred to separate deep review
06

Intentional exclusions

What this engagement did not include

The following activities were intentionally excluded by the agreed verification-first scope. Their absence is not an omission or incomplete performance.

  • Comprehensive or line-by-line security auditing of every execution path
  • Full vulnerability discovery, security grading, or a no-findings conclusion
  • Exploit development, attack simulation, penetration testing, or transaction replay
  • Formal verification, exhaustive fuzzing, invariant, unit, integration, fork, gas, or economic testing
  • Deep review of third-party position managers, pool managers, tokens, hooks, or imported libraries
  • Validation of live locks, balances, historical transactions, fee accounting, or liquidity positions
  • Review of the BASEDBID launchpad, front end, back end, treasury, governance, or unlisted contracts
  • Operational-key, custody, legal, regulatory, tokenomic, market, or business-model review